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how to  
 Fix the Fed
c
ongressman Jeb hensarling (r-TX) introduced 
the Financial choIce act to reform the Federal 
reserve in late 2016 and is expected to resubmit it 
early in the new session of congress. Its key mon-
etary policy focus is on imposing a monetary rule on 
the operation of the Fed. This is a worthwhile effort, 
like its many other admirable features, but it does 
not address the Fed’s asset powers or its new ability 
to pay excessive interest on reserves, which over the past eight years have 
allowed the Fed to inflate its balance sheet, and to do so without little effect 
on monetary aggregates. Just as the Fed caused the Great recession by 
stagnant growth of its monetary base, its expanded powers since late 2008 
allowed it to prolong the recession and stifle the recovery and expansion 
while appearing to provide explosive stimulus. The Fed focused on ex-
panding its credit and expanding its lender-of-last-resort function while re-
straining the growth of monetary aggregates and bank credit. The Fed has 
not acted in such a counterproductive manner since october 1931, when 
it raised the discount rate in the midst of the Great Depression. Without a 
focus on money, adherence to an interest rate rule will not be effective in 
achieving low inflation and monetary stability. 
The seeming paradox of U.S. monetary policy is that the Federal 
reserve’s ballooning balance sheet has been accompanied by recession, 
financial crisis, a tepid recovery, and restrained inflation, not evidence of 
historic monetary policy stimulus. The resolution of this puzzle is the shift 
The ineffectiveness of the U.S. 
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of the Fed to a focus on its own credit creation, which it 
largely sterilized using sizeable above-market and ques-
tionable subsidies to banks for holding excess reserves, 
with the indirect result that money often has grown at a 
recessionary pace despite the explosion of Fed credit. 
Fed assets are about five times larger now than the 
$894 billion registered at the end of 2007 when the re-
cession began, rising $3.6 trillion since then. Until 2008, 
Fed actions that changed its credit supply (reserve Bank 
credit) also changed its monetary base, the base for the 
nation’s money stock. Beginning in late 2008, however, 
the Fed was able to separate credit creation and money 
creation. Instead of a five-fold increase, the Fed’s effective 
monetary base, the monetary base excluding bank excess 
reserves, rose only 86.4 percent, or at a 7.3 percent annual 
rate since the end of 2007, only slightly faster than the 
7 percent rate over the previous thirty years. This is not 
the extremely inflationary pace suggested by many ana-
lysts who have focused on the huge increase in the Fed’s 
balance sheet. But disturbingly, there have been episodes 
of unusually slow growth in the Fed’s effective monetary 
base that explained the onset of recession, its depth and 
length, and the weak recovery. 
The Fed separated the expansion of Fed credit from 
money by introducing relatively high, subsidized interest 
on excess reserves. This made it possible for the Fed to 
buy trillions of dollars of high-risk securities, including 
some $1.7 trillion of mortgage-backed securities, and 
to induce banks to hold the receipts from those sales as 
excess reserves instead of expanding bank lending and 
checkable deposits. 
The origins for paying inTeresT on reserves
Fed payment of interest on reserves was authorized by 
congress in 2006 to begin in the fall of 2011. The an-
nounced purpose was to reduce a bank practice of sweep-
ing business checkable deposits overnight into money mar-
ket deposit accounts to avoid required reserves. In the face 
of the financial crisis, congress shifted the date to october 
1, 2008, with the emergency economic Stabilization act 
of 2008. Ironically, the Fed ceased monitoring or report-
ing these sweep balances in march 2013. apparently this 
rationale was no longer germane. 
Paying interest on required reserves was long advo-
cated by economists because reserve requirements act as 
a tax on banks. milton Friedman was a strong advocate 
of paying interest on required reserves in order to remove 
banks’ incentives to create products that can avoid the 
reserve tax or other schemes to avoid the inefficiency of 
the reserve tax. The appropriate rate for the Fed to pay 
is the risk-free rate on a comparable duration asset. and 
this is exactly what congress allowed the Fed to pay. The 
overnight rate on a one-day Treasury bill would be the 
closest comparable rate, though it has less liquidity than 
reserves at the Fed. The closest widely published rate is 
the four-week Treasury bill rate and it is the rate used here. 
From the outset, the Fed has not only paid an excessive 
interest rate on required reserves, but it also has paid the 
same rate on excess reserves, which are voluntarily held 
for their superior in-kind benefits, such a greater liquidity 
and lower transaction costs.  
There is no economic justification for paying inter-
est on excess reserves. excess reserves are not required 
by law and offer attractive benefits that other short-term 
riskless assets do not. For example, excess reserves are 
more liquid than Treasury bills because they are “imme-
diately available funds,” the kind of funds that attracted 
many large investment banks to obtain a bank charter at 
the peak of the financial crisis so they could have direct 
access to Fed lending of such funds. excess reserves also 
come with an unlimited duration option at no cost, another 
serious disadvantage over a Treasury bill. 
From 2009 to november 2015, when the interest rate 
on excess reserves was 0.25 percent, the yield on four-week 
Treasury securities, which probably overstates the more ap-
propriately comparable one-day rate on Treasury bills, av-
eraged six basis points, far below the 25-basis-point interest 
rate on reserves, resulting in a 19-basis-point subsidy. In 
the first ten months of 2016, following the Fed’s December 
2015 increase in the interest rate on reserves to 50 basis 
The seeming paradox of U.S. monetary 
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points, the four-week Treasury securities rate rose to an 
average of 23 basis points, resulting in a 27-basis-point 
subsidy. In January 2017, following the mid-December 
2016 increase in the interest rate on reserves to 75 basis 
points, the comparable rate on Treasury securities rose to 
an average of 49 basis points, keeping the average subsidy 
rate nearly unchanged at 26 basis points. as the demand 
for credit increases and upward pressures on Treasury bill 
rates grow, the Fed will be forced to increase the interest 
rate on excess reserves much more to avoid strongly infla-
tionary reductions in excess reserves that cannot be off-
set by other measures to soak up excess reserves, such as 
the new arrangements for reverse repurchase agreements, 
term deposits of depository institutions, or other arrange-
ments with the U.S. Treasury to boost their balances held 
at the Fed, instead of at banks. 
From october 2008 through January 2017, the Fed 
paid banks an estimated $44.7 billion of taxpayer money 
for holding excess reserves ($43.2 billion) and for the sub-
sidy for holding required reserves ($1.1 billion), in addi-
tion to the $0.5 billion required to compensate banks for the 
loss of the four-week Treasury yield for holding required 
reserves. all estimates here are based on data from the 
Federal reserve Board of Governors’ Statistical releases 
and from the Federal reserve Bank of Saint louis FreD 
database; figures may not add due to rounding.
another perspective is that the Fed has been paying 
about one hundred times as much interest on reserves as 
would be required by the tax-efficiency argument. For the 
given reserve structure in october 2016 to January 2017, 
the 25-basis-point increase on December 15, 2016, to 75 
basis points, raised the annual subsidy to $15.2 billion per 
year, three times what it would have been if the 25 basis 
points paid from october 2008 to December 2015 had con-
tinued. The total subsidy to banks is accelerating rapidly 
due to the small increases in the interest rate on reserves 
(and federal funds rate at the end of 2015 and 2016). Three 
more 25-basis-point increases in the Fed’s interest rate on 
reserves in 2017, currently widely anticipated, will put the 
interest rate on reserves up to 1.5 percent and double the 
current annual subsidy cost to $30.4 billion, virtually all a 
gift to large and mostly foreign banks. 
Some economists argue that paying interest on excess 
reserves has no effect on the economy and that excess 
reserves simply replace Treasury bill holdings at banks. 
of course, banks never held such massive quantities of 
Treasury bills. and the cost to the Treasury of an equal 
amount of T-bills would be far less because more than half 
of interest payments to banks have been in excess of com-
parable Treasury rates. more importantly, these payments 
have other deleterious effects on the financial system and 
the economy that would not occur if Treasury bills had 
been issued instead of excess reserves. 
The ineffecTiveness of fed crediT policy
a large Fed balance sheet and substantial excess reserves 
have no monetary policy advantage for the Fed. The Fed 
creates money. It does not require a large balance sheet 
to intervene in a crisis. excess bank reserves do not af-
fect bank insolvency, the principal regulatory concern; 
they only change the composition of bank assets. a large 
balance sheet that does not expand the effective monetary 
base cannot stimulate the economy.
When the Fed acquires assets, it normally increases its 
monetary base, the money stock, and monetary credit. But 
when banks sterilize the asset purchases by inducing banks 
to equally increase excess reserves, no money or credit is 
created. To the extent that banks increased their excess re-
serves, the money stock and stimulus to spending, output, 
employment, and inflation expanded far less than the Fed’s 
balance sheet expansion suggested to many analysts.
more importantly, increasing Fed credit without 
changing the Fed’s effective monetary base does not change 
the total credit created through money creation. It simply 
replaces bank credit on bank balance sheets with excess 
reserves. Bank credit, the lifeblood of risk-based lending 
that promotes economic growth, is reduced while Fed credit 
expands. a high level of bank reserves induced by central 
bank policy is called financial repression because it reduces 
the size and efficiency of the private financial system and 
retards its contribution to economic growth. In most finan-
cially repressive countries, the central bank represses the 
banking system and private economy by imposing man-
datory and relatively high reserve requirements that foster 
larger central bank and bank holdings of government debt 
and relatively low (often politically targeted) bank lend-
ing to the private sector. In the U.S. case, this is done by 
the Fed’s creation of effective subsidies for banks to hold 
The Fed focused on expanding its credit 
and expanding its lender-of-last-resort 
function while restraining the growth of 
monetary aggregates and bank credit.
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relatively large excess reserves. Bank excess reserves today 
exceed 160 percent of all of the checkable deposits in the 
nation’s banking system. 
Incredibly, Fed officials have stewed for years over 
the weakness of commercial bank credit. While Fed credit 
expanded nearly five-fold, commercial bank credit grew at 
only a 2.6 percent annual rate from September 2008, just 
prior to the beginning of interest on reserves, to the end 
of the Fed’s third quantitative easing program in october 
2014. This anemic rate was less than one-third of the 9.3 
percent pace in the previous comparable six-year period. 
This slow credit growth was an inevitable consequence of 
Fed policy to subsidize bank holding of excess reserves, 
but the Fed blamed the dismal lending on banks’ unwill-
ingness to lend. In the two years since Qe3 ended, along 
with excess reserve growth, bank credit has accelerated to 
a 7.7 percent rate. Given the effective monetary base and 
money, an increase in Fed credit (and equal rise in excess 
reserves) is offset by an equal decline in bank credit. The 
Fed seems to have no recognition that its own credit ac-
tions, matched by massive growth in bank excess reserves, 
depressed bank credit by over $2 trillion. 
 
WhaT can Be done? 
The Fed could repair its balance sheet and boost bank 
credit simply by reversing past actions. Since the last re-
cession began, the Fed has accumulated about $3.5 trillion 
of securities; 77 percent of bank receipts from these Fed 
purchases were added to excess reserves. Simply ending 
the subsidized interest on excess reserves would allow the 
Fed to sell the $2.7 trillion of its securities held at the peak 
of excess reserves in august 2014 and incur a matching de-
cline in banks’ excess reserves. Such an operation would 
have no effect on the effective monetary base, monetary 
aggregates, or total credit created in the money creation 
process. Fed credit and excess reserves would contract by 
$2.7 trillion, but commercial bank credit would rise by an 
equal amount. This is precisely where risky assets should 
be held if banks are to promote growth and if the Fed is to 
get out of the credit allocation business.
There is a widespread view that reducing the interest 
rate on excess reserves to zero would be extremely dis-
ruptive to the financial system, perhaps even recessionary. 
The problem with that view is that it ignores the fact that 
the past build-up in assets and excess reserves that would 
be reversed also has had no effect on the effective mon-
etary base or monetary aggregates. Thus, by itself, it had 
no effect on GDP, output, employment, or inflation; and 
its rapid reversal would similarly have no direct effects. 
The periodically weak growth in the effective monetary 
base and the financial repression at banks of course did 
deepen and extend the recession, and weaken the recovery. 
reversing the build-up of the Fed’s assets and excess re-
serves would remove the distortions of the Fed and banks’ 
balance sheets, boost risk-taking and private investment, 
and in turn boost economic growth.  
The Fed responded to the financial crisis by develop-
ing more than a dozen new financing and liquidity facilities 
available to a variety of institutions that had never before 
had access to the Fed. most of these facilities were unnec-
essary or ineffective and have expired, but the authority 
to resurrect them remains. The two newest programs, the 
overnight reverse repurchase Facility and term deposits 
at the Fed, are responses to the risks created by the build-up 
in excess reserves. eliminating interest on excess reserves 
as proposed above could eliminate excess reserves and their 
unintended effects, as well as the case for these two pro-
grams. The Fed could eliminate all of the remaining innova-
tions it adopted during the financial crisis, but such actions 
would not eliminate their ability to resurrect them. 
congress could take a major step in fixing the Fed’s 
problems by eliminating the Fed’s authority to pay interest 
on excess reserves and a subsidy rate on required reserves. 
It could also remove the open-ended authority for the Fed 
to take on emergency lending powers that by their nature 
reduce the Fed’s focus on monetary policy and financial 
stability. only congress can put an end to the mission creep 
that lies behind the Fed’s ineffectiveness and its failure to 
pursue its traditional goals.  u
Money often has grown at  
a recessionary pace despite  
the explosion of Fed credit.
A large balance sheet that does not 
expand the effective monetary base 
cannot stimulate the economy.
